Next which country russia is going to attack.

 Predicting Russia's next military move after the ongoing war in Ukraine is a complex and speculative exercise, as it depends on numerous unpredictable factors, including the ultimate outcome of the current conflict, the stability of Russia's internal politics, the extent of Western support for Ukraine, and the global geopolitical landscape. However, based on Russia's stated strategic objectives, historical patterns of aggression, and existing territorial disputes, several countries are frequently cited as potential flashpoints.

One of the most commonly discussed scenarios involves Moldova, specifically the breakaway region of Transnistria. Russia already maintains a military presence there, and the region has a Russian-speaking population, which Moscow has historically used as a pretext for intervention. If Russia were to secure a land bridge to Transnistria through Ukraine, the likelihood of direct action against Moldova could significantly increase, as Moldova is not a NATO member and its military capabilities are limited. An attack here could be framed as "protecting" Russian speakers or supporting a pro-Russian regime, similar to the justifications used in Ukraine.

Another area of significant concern is the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). These countries are NATO members, which means an attack on any of them would trigger Article 5, obligating all NATO members to come to their defense. This makes a direct conventional invasion highly risky for Russia, as it would lead to a direct conflict with the entire NATO alliance. However, concerns persist about "hybrid warfare" tactics, such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and the instigation of unrest among Russian-speaking minorities, potentially followed by limited incursions. The Suwalki Gap, a narrow land corridor between Belarus and Russia's Kaliningrad exclave that separates Poland from the Baltic states, is considered a critical strategic point. Control of this gap would effectively cut off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO by land, making it a potential flashpoint in any broader conflict.

Georgia also remains a vulnerable country. Russia recognized the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 war and maintains military bases there. Any political instability or perceived shift towards Western alignment in Georgia could be met with further Russian intervention, ostensibly to protect its interests or existing "peacekeeping" forces. Like Moldova, Georgia is not a NATO member, making it a potentially easier target than the Baltic states.

Beyond these immediate neighbors, Russia's broader strategic objectives include undermining Western influence, challenging the post-Cold War security order, and establishing a multipolar world where Russia holds significant sway. This larger ambition suggests that even without direct military invasion, Russia will likely continue to exert pressure and destabilize countries in its perceived sphere of influence through various means, including political interference, economic coercion, and cyber warfare. The long-term reconstitution of Russia's military, even if it takes several years post-Ukraine, aims to strengthen its capacity for future confrontations, particularly against NATO expansion. Therefore, while a direct, large-scale conventional attack on a NATO member remains a high-risk proposition, Russia's long-term confrontational stance with the West means that tensions and the potential for limited provocations or indirect actions are likely to persist across Europe's eastern flank. The specific target and nature of any future Russian aggression will largely depend on Russia's assessment of its own military capabilities, the West's resolve, and the evolving geopolitical landscape after the Ukraine war concludes.