How much weapons Russia have now?

 Estimating precisely how many "days of weapons" Russia possesses to face a full-fledged war with NATO is a complex question with no definitive answer, as it depends on numerous unpredictable factors. However, we can analyze Russia's current military posture, production capabilities, and strategic considerations to provide a realistic assessment.

Russia's Current Reserves and Production:

Russia has significantly ramped up its military production since the invasion of Ukraine. It has shifted to a "war economy," with defense spending reaching historic highs, projected to be around 13.5 trillion rubles (approximately $132 billion) in 2025. This commitment is evident in several areas:

 * Ammunition: Russia is reportedly producing or refurbishing 3-4 million artillery rounds in 2023, with a forecast of 4.5 million in 2024. This is a substantial increase and likely outpaces current NATO production in certain ammunition types. Some reports suggest Russia produces more ammunition than all NATO nations combined, estimated at seven times the amount of the West.

 * Tanks and Armored Vehicles: While heavily reliant on older, refurbished models, Russia has increased its tank production, with estimates of around 280 new T-90M tanks per year and a total of 1,500 tanks expected to be delivered to the military by 2025 (including refurbished ones). They have a large existing stock of tanks (around 5,750) and armored vehicles (over 131,000), though their readiness varies.

 * Missiles and Drones: Russia has significantly boosted its missile and drone production. It is estimated to produce over 200 cruise and ballistic missiles per month, totaling 2,400-3,000 annually. Drone production has also surged, with ambitions to produce 3-4 million drones in 2025. This is a critical area where Russia is gaining an advantage, as these systems are increasingly integrated into their strike packages.

 * Aircraft: Russia can produce an estimated 50-60 combat aircraft per year.

 * Air Defense Systems: Russia's S-400 battery production is estimated at 36 systems per year.

Factors Influencing War Duration:

 * Consumption Rates: The actual "days of weapons" depends heavily on the intensity and scale of combat. A full-fledged war with NATO would involve immense consumption of munitions, fuel, and spare parts. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, while large-scale, would likely be dwarfed by a direct confrontation with NATO.

 * Attrition: Both sides would suffer significant losses of equipment and personnel. Russia's ability to replace these losses, both through production and mobilization, would be crucial. While Russia has been actively recruiting and boasts a large reserve pool, sustaining high casualty rates over an extended period would be challenging.

 * Sanctions and Supply Chains: Western sanctions have impacted Russia's ability to acquire advanced components and technologies, potentially hindering the production of sophisticated weaponry. While Russia has found ways to mitigate some of these effects through allies like North Korea, China, and Iran, long-term sustainment of high-tech systems could be an issue.

 * NATO's Industrial Capacity: While Russia has ramped up its production, NATO's combined industrial capacity is vastly superior, particularly the United States. While individual European nations have sometimes lagged in defense spending and production, there's a concerted effort to increase output. For example, the US aims to produce 1.2 million 155mm shells annually by the end of 2025, with Europe also significantly increasing its production.

 * Technological Superiority: NATO generally holds a technological edge, particularly in areas like precision-guided munitions, air superiority, and electronic warfare, although Russia has made advancements in missile and drone technology and electronic warfare capabilities.

 * Economic Sustainment: While Russia has allocated a massive portion of its budget to defense, NATO's combined GDP dwarfs Russia's. This vast economic disparity means NATO has a much greater capacity for long-term sustainment and escalation of production.

Conclusion:

Given Russia's current production rates and existing stockpiles, particularly in artillery ammunition, missiles, and drones, they likely have sufficient "weapons" for an intense initial phase of a conflict with NATO, potentially lasting for weeks to a few months of high-intensity combat.

However, sustaining a full-fledged war against the combined economic and industrial might of NATO beyond this initial period would be incredibly challenging for Russia. While Russia has successfully transitioned to a war economy and increased output in many areas, NATO's long-term production potential and technological superiority would likely prove decisive in a protracted conflict. Analysts suggest Russia could sustain its current level of operations in Ukraine through 2027, but a direct, full-scale confrontation with NATO would exert far greater pressure on its resources and manpower, potentially exhausting its capacity for prolonged, high-intensity warfare within a matter of months, rather than years.