None of the above is to defend the Trump administration’s overall approach to Russia’s war in Ukraine or European security. Many (Crisis Group included) have argued that the U.S. should have remained circumspect about Ukraine’s possible NATO membership or security guarantees pending negotiations, so that it could play this card in seeking a deal with Russia (which has its own vision of security guarantees in the form of a compact between itself and outside powers that gives Moscow a veto over others’ response to further aggression). Trump’s strategy of making other concessions to Russia in advance of negotiations – eg, by suspending the Defense Department’s offensive cyber operations – is also puzzling. Nor does belittling and humiliating Zelenskyy in front of a global audience, or blaming Ukraine for a war that Russia started, do anything to advance the cause of peace and security, though it no doubt played well with the Trump-Vance political base. But none of these challenges will be alleviated, and indeed all may be aggravated, by any continued efforts to extract U.S. guarantees in any form. Not only would this approach fail, but it would also feed a corrosive right-wing “MAGA” narrative that Washington’s partners are trying to drag the U.S. into World War III.
Looking beyond guarantees, there are a number of items where consensus seems possible and could lay the groundwork for a sustainable peace, but where details need to be nailed down and a position agreed upon among (ideally) the U.S., Europe and Ukraine in advance of further direct U.S.-Russia talks and other negotiations that may take place.
First, the key to Ukraine’s long-term defence is likely to be its own military capacity. While Kyiv may not be able to look to Washington as a major benefactor going forward, it should try to secure a commitment that the Trump team will not bargain away its ability to defend itself – something the White House could not, in any case, commit to on Ukraine’s behalf. In concrete terms, Ukraine should be able to maintain a force of sufficient size and capacity to impose serious costs and hold back Russian forces (as it has done for more than three years) should Moscow seek to advance again. Anything less would leave Ukraine and its European backers insecure and Moscow emboldened to test their limits. If the U.S. is willing to supply some arms to Kyiv, all the better. But it should at least be ready to sell them to European countries, which would then transfer them to Ukraine, with the understanding that Europe will ramp up its own arms industry more quickly to fill the gap that would otherwise follow the U.S. cutoff. To be sure, Moscow will seek significant limits to Ukraine’s military capability: when the two sides negotiated three years ago, this capacity was a main sticking point. But no pact will be sustainable if it leaves Ukraine defenceless. The European Council’s 6 March statement sends the right signal on this point.
Secondly, for months, European leaders have been working on various formulas for a European force in Ukraine that might have one of several purposes. It could be a peacekeeping force; or serve as a “tripwire” to draw in NATO should Russia reinvade; or perhaps function to raise the costs of a potential reinvasion high enough to deter Moscow. In general, these proposals have tended to look to the U.S. for “backstopping”, by which European leaders mostly mean that the U.S. would step in should their troops come under attack and likely facilitate deployment. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a European force in the near term that does not at least somewhat rely on essential U.S.-provided capabilities such as airlift, logistics and intelligence. Whether Europe has a vision that would not depend on Washington and whether, were they to deploy and come under Russian attack, European capitals themselves are ready to go to war over Ukraine, remains unclear. In any case, if the vision for such a deployment is that it would follow a peace deal or ceasefire, it would also require Russian agreement: while Trump has ventured that Russia might be amenable, senior Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the idea of troops from any NATO member state deploying in Ukraine.
Thirdly, the mineral deal that Zelenskyy went to Washington to sign remains on the table and, for all that it exploits Ukraine’s vulnerability, is an opportunity to be taken. In Trump’s own messaging, it would create a U.S. incentive to defend Ukraine in the form of U.S. business interests engaged on the ground. In reality, the extent of Ukrainian mineral wealth and the cost of extracting it is uncertain (years of exploration will likely be required to determine and develop the deposits), as is how much extra security the proposed arrangement would offer Kyiv beyond existing U.S. business and cultural engagement in Ukraine. Still, it is at least plausible that the mineral deal could be a way to bring Kyiv and Washington closer while potentially increasing Washington’s sense of investment in Ukraine and adding to the list of reasons for Moscow to think twice about a future attack. It can only help that Trump’s statements suggest he is thinking along these lines.
Fourthly, while it is difficult to contemplate rewarding Russia for its aggression, in Kyiv and in the capitals of countries backing Ukraine, most acknowledge that territorial concessions will have to be part of the bargain, whether they involve freezing the current battle lines or a partial Russian retreat in exchange for Ukrainian forces’ withdrawal from the parts of Russia’s Kursk region they now occupy. But in addition to the question of where lines are drawn, there is the question of how Russian rule is characterised. In Moscow, Kyiv and Western capitals, the expectation has long been that any acceptance of Russian control will be one of de facto authority (technically, it would be the occupying power under international humanitarian law, not the sovereign). But comments by President Trump that his administration is itself interested in annexing territory in Canada, Greenland and Panama raises the possibility that it may be willing to offer Russia full de jure recognition that the territories have been annexed. Should the U.S. do that, it could have deleterious knock-on effects. A world in which more powerful countries feel unconstrained in forcibly annexing the land of weaker neighbours portends an explosive free-for-all, a far cry from the global peace that Trump has said he seeks.
Fifthly, and finally, Kyiv can regain the initiative and underline its commitment to and desire for peace by making clear that it is not only willing to implement a partial ceasefire, as President Zelenskyy suggested on 5 March, but a complete ceasefire if Russia agrees to do the same. Zelenskyy should also clearly and forcefully reiterate his willingness to meet with his Russian counterpart and embark on peace talks with no preconditions. These moves would put the ball for both cessation of hostilities and the start of talks back in Moscow’s court. They might even offer Washington an opportunity to facilitate such talks. To date, Moscow has been unwilling to entertain a ceasefire, but its language on talking to Kyiv has seemingly softened lately.
Conclusion
Events in recent weeks have underscored that the path to peace in Ukraine remains challenging and fraught. To some extent, the White House’s eruption at Zelenskyy for what arguably boils down to his perceived failure to fall in line with its preferences underscores the reality that peace cannot be forged without the direct involvement of Kyiv and its European backers. While Washington can, indeed, change incentives for all parties by providing and withholding support for Ukraine and by rethinking its security commitments to Europe more broadly, all the parties have their own decisions to make. But just as Moscow and Washington cannot impose a deal on Ukraine and its other backers, Kyiv and its friends cannot force Washington to shift its own positions. Security guarantees from the U.S. were and remain off the table. But efforts at aligning Kyiv, Washington and European capitals on other key points ahead of what look set to be further direct talks between the U.S. and Russia could still help prepare the way for more successful negotiations and perhaps even bring a sustainable peace within reach.
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