Why Russia Is Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine Now:--------------------------

Arguably, Belarus has been covered by Russia’s extended deterrence for decades as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization; however, Russia has not explicitly mentioned Belarus in its doctrine until now. This could be emblematic of an increasingly close strategic relationship between Moscow and Minsk, as Rusia deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus this year.

Second, Russia’s 2020 doctrine explained nuclear weapons could be used against conventional attacks “when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy” and said nuclear deterrence “guarantees protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State.” Putin’s explanation of the new doctrine, however, drops this phrase, instead stating nuclear weapons could be used against a “critical threat to our sovereignty,” a much broader and more ambiguous phrasing, which would affirm suspicions of Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy. What this suggests is that Putin is lowering the threshold for potential nuclear use while also increasing ambiguity about when nuclear weapons would be used. It signals a willingness to take greater risks in the war in Ukraine and attempts to sow uncertainty into the minds of Russia’s adversaries.

Third, the new doctrine holds responsible third-party states that support conventional attacks on Russia, even if they are not the ones conducting the attacks. Putin said, “The updated version of the document proposes that aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear-weapon state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear-weapon state, should be considered as a joint attack on the Russian Federation.” This change, in particular, seems clearly targeted at NATO members arming Ukraine in the ongoing war.

Finally, the previous doctrine said nuclear weapons could be used in the event of data confirming an incoming ballistic missile attack, but the new version also expands the nature of incoming attacks that could warrant nuclear use to include “aerospace attack,” such as “aircraft, missiles, and drones.” This, also, seems clearly tailored to the ongoing war in Ukraine and an attempt to increase the stakes for NATO members supporting Ukraine. The main takeaway from these changes in Russia’s doctrine is that they are targeted at NATO in the context of Ukraine, signaling an expansion of circumstances under which Russia would use nuclear weapons and a greater willingness to escalate the ongoing war.

Russia’s Attempt to Up the Stakes

These changes in nuclear doctrine suggest that Russia is doubling down on its strategy of relying on nuclear weapons for coercive purposes in the ongoing war in Ukraine. Arguably, this approach has a mixed track record. On the one hand, Russian nuclear threats may have delayed Western military support for Ukraine in the early days of the war, following Putin’s threat to inflict consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history” if the West interfered with the special military operation. On the other hand, ongoing nuclear threats have not deterred expanding NATO support for Ukraine, along with the expansion of the alliance itself. One example of failed threats was Russia’s 2022 warnings that supplying Ukraine with missiles would cross a “red line”: U.S. allies have faced no repercussions for doing so. If anything, these statements have led to unwanted consequences from Moscow’s perspective, such as the expansion of NATO.

Given the mixed—at best—track record, why would Russia double down on its strategy of nuclear bullying, and why now? One possibility is that Russia doesn’t see its nuclear threats as unsuccessful and has instead focused on the nominal gains of nuclear bullying. This might include slowing the delivery of key capabilities to Ukraine, including tanks, fighter jets, and missiles.

Another possibility is that Russia thinks past attempts at deterrence failed because they weren’t “big” enough. This is a particularly dangerous consideration because at some point there will be internal and reputational pressure to uphold a redline. A final possibility, and the one that seems most likely, is that Putin thinks the context has changed so perhaps the threats will be more successful under different conditions. Putin could perceive that NATO is more divided now over the issue of long-range strikes than earlier in the war and see it as an opportunity to sow further divisions among the allies and undermine external support for Ukraine.

The key for the United States and NATO allies is to hold the course in remaining united in support for Ukraine and NATO’s nuclear mission. To be sure, the risk of nuclear use in Ukraine should be taken seriously; however, Putin’s attempt to highlight an asymmetry of stakes should not undermine NATO’s position. At the Washington summit, NATO members agreed, “The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” Additionally, the United States has conducted a “strategy-driven review” of the U.S. nuclear posture and modernization plans, and Biden administration officials have confirmed that, in the absence of arms control and if U.S. adversaries stay on their current trajectories, the U.S. nuclear arsenal may be “necessary but not sufficient,” and there is a growing debate about options for potentially changing or expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

But it is not only the United States and other NATO members that have an opportunity to restrain Russia’s nuclear bullying. Many of Russia’s partners are members of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which bans threats of nuclear use. Given their positions on nuclear deterrence and disarmament, they may be better positioned to condemn Russia’s ongoing nuclear threats, either publicly or privately, and encourage Moscow to engage in arms control dialogues. Barring any change in the costs Moscow feels for this type of nuclear rhetoric, it is likely to continue on the current trajectory. The new nuclear doctrine is just the latest attempt at nuclear bullying against Ukraine, and deterring and dividing Western support for Kyiv.