Education and jhadi movement
jihadi movement in bangladesh
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Why did it happen?Bangladesh’s antagonistic politics have played a part in enabling the jihadist resurgence. The state confronted groups responsible for an earlier wave of violence with some success from 2004 to 2008. Subsequently, especially since controversial January 2014 elections, bitter political divisions have reopened space for new forms of jihadist activism.
Why does it matter?A lull in violence over recent months may prove only a temporary respite. With elections approaching in December, politics could become even more toxic. The government’s continued marginalisation of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and its forcing underground of opponents like Jamaat-e-Islami, risk sapping resources from efforts to disrupt jihadists.
What should be done?Instead of relying on indiscriminate force, including alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the government should adopt a counter-terrorism strategy anchored in reformed criminal justice and better intelligence gathering. Rather than cracking down on rivals, it should forge a broad social and political consensus on how to confront the threat.
Executive Summary
The country’s recent history of jihadism dates to the late 1990s, when veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan returned to Bangladesh. A first wave of violence, involving two groups, the Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh and the JMB, peaked on 17 August 2005, when the latter group synchronised bomb blasts in 63 of the country’s 64 districts. Successive governments subsequently took action against the JMB’s leadership, but the group has revived itself, albeit in a new form. Another group, Ansarul Islam (or Ansar), has also emerged, while a JMB splinter – dubbed the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” by law enforcement agencies – calls itself the Islamic State-Bangladesh and has funnelled fighters into Iraq and Syria.
Ansar portrays itself as the defender of Islam from those who – in its leaders’ view – explicitly attack the religion. The JMB, on the other hand, has named a longer list of enemies: it considers perceived symbols of the secular state and anyone not subscribing to its interpretation of Islam as legitimate targets. The Bangladesh police allege that JMB operatives have played a part in attacks claimed by ISIS on prominent members of minority communities and religious facilities and events, including Ahmadi mosques, Sufi shrines, Buddhist and Hindu temples, and Shia festivals. An attack on a Dhaka café on 1-2 July 2016 that killed over twenty people, mostly foreigners, appears to have involved loose cooperation between different groups, including both rural-based madrasa students and elite urban young men.
I.Introduction
II.Genesis of Jihadist Militancy
in Bangladesh
III.Setting the Stage
for a Jihadist Resurgence
A.Politicised Justice
and an Islamist Backlash
B.Political
Polarisation
IV.Today’s Jihadist
Landscape
A.Ansarul Islam
B.Jamaat-ul Mujahideen
Bangladesh
C.“Neo-Jamaat-ul
Mujahideen” and ISIS
V.Flashpoints
A.Resentment in the
Military
B.The Rohingya Crisis
VI.The State’s Response
A.Blunt Force
B.Following the Money
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· What’s new?Two groups, Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh and Ansarul Islam,
dominate Bangladesh’s jihadist landscape today. Attacks since 2013 have
targeted secular activists, intellectuals and foreigners, as well as religious
and sectarian minorities. The ruling Awami League has politicised the threat; its
crackdowns on rivals undermine efforts to disrupt jihadist recruitment and
attacks.
Why did it happen?Bangladesh’s antagonistic politics have played a part in enabling the jihadist resurgence. The state confronted groups responsible for an earlier wave of violence with some success from 2004 to 2008. Subsequently, especially since controversial January 2014 elections, bitter political divisions have reopened space for new forms of jihadist activism.
Why does it matter?A lull in violence over recent months may prove only a temporary respite. With elections approaching in December, politics could become even more toxic. The government’s continued marginalisation of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and its forcing underground of opponents like Jamaat-e-Islami, risk sapping resources from efforts to disrupt jihadists.
What should be done?Instead of relying on indiscriminate force, including alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the government should adopt a counter-terrorism strategy anchored in reformed criminal justice and better intelligence gathering. Rather than cracking down on rivals, it should forge a broad social and political consensus on how to confront the threat.
Executive Summary
As Bangladesh’s
political polarisation reaches historic highs and local jihadist groups forge
links with transnational movements, conditions are ripe for new forms of
militancy that could threaten the country’s security and religious tolerance.
Two groups, Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarul Islam, dominate
today’s jihadist landscape; a faction of the former appears to have
consolidated links to the Islamic State (ISIS) while the latter is affiliated
with al-Qaeda’s South Asian branch. Both have perpetrated a string of attacks
over the past few years, some targeting secular activists, others Bangladeshi
minorities. The ruling Awami League has politicised the threat. Its crackdowns
on political rivals sap resources from efforts to disrupt jihadist activities.
Instead, it should invest in reinforcing the capability of the security forces
and judiciary and build political consensus on how to tackle the threat.
The country’s recent history of jihadism dates to the late 1990s, when veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan returned to Bangladesh. A first wave of violence, involving two groups, the Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh and the JMB, peaked on 17 August 2005, when the latter group synchronised bomb blasts in 63 of the country’s 64 districts. Successive governments subsequently took action against the JMB’s leadership, but the group has revived itself, albeit in a new form. Another group, Ansarul Islam (or Ansar), has also emerged, while a JMB splinter – dubbed the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” by law enforcement agencies – calls itself the Islamic State-Bangladesh and has funnelled fighters into Iraq and Syria.
Ansar portrays itself as the defender of Islam from those who – in its leaders’ view – explicitly attack the religion. The JMB, on the other hand, has named a longer list of enemies: it considers perceived symbols of the secular state and anyone not subscribing to its interpretation of Islam as legitimate targets. The Bangladesh police allege that JMB operatives have played a part in attacks claimed by ISIS on prominent members of minority communities and religious facilities and events, including Ahmadi mosques, Sufi shrines, Buddhist and Hindu temples, and Shia festivals. An attack on a Dhaka café on 1-2 July 2016 that killed over twenty people, mostly foreigners, appears to have involved loose cooperation between different groups, including both rural-based madrasa students and elite urban young men.
Bangladesh’s contentious national politics have played a role in enabling the jihadist resurgence.
Bangladesh’s
contentious national politics have played a role in enabling the jihadist
resurgence. Ansar found its initial raison d’être in the
Awami League government’s post-2010 trials of people accused of war crimes
perpetrated in the 1971 war of independence. Those trials, targeting the senior
leadership of the largest Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), prompted
criticism for violating due process, lacking transparency, and involving
intimidation and harassment of defence lawyers and witnesses. The prosecutions
were used to crush the JeI, a close ally of the Awami League’s main political
rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and to discredit the BNP itself.
They provoked widespread anger among Islamists, which was mostly expressed
through mass protest, not jihadist violence. Yet Ansar, depicting the trials as
an assault on Islam, recruited urban, educated youth, albeit in relatively
small numbers, and perpetrated brutal attacks on secular activists and bloggers
who had demanded harsh punishment for those prosecuted.
Political polarisation has contributed to the growth of militancy in less direct ways, too. The marginalisation of the BNP through politically motivated corruption and other trials of its leadership, including party chief Khaleda Zia’s 8 February 2018 conviction and five-year sentence for corruption, and of the JeI, through the war crimes trials and a ban on its participation in elections, have eliminated most democratic competition and encouraged the growth of a jihadist fringe. A purge of BNP and JeI sympathisers from the armed forces has elicited animosity within some military circles toward the Awami League, which the jihadists also appear to be seeking to exploit. The BNP, for its part, has on occasion used terrible violence, or supported groups that do so, fuelling political animus and deepening schisms.
The influx of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s Rakhine state in August-December 2017 also raises security concerns for Bangladesh. Jihadist groups – including ISIS and Pakistani militants – have referenced the Rohingya’s plight in efforts to mobilise support. For now, though, little suggests that the refugees are particularly susceptible to jihadist recruitment. Bangladesh’s response to the humanitarian tragedy should focus primarily not on counter-terrorism but on providing support for refugees and redoubling efforts to assuage potential friction between them and host communities.
Political polarisation has contributed to the growth of militancy in less direct ways, too. The marginalisation of the BNP through politically motivated corruption and other trials of its leadership, including party chief Khaleda Zia’s 8 February 2018 conviction and five-year sentence for corruption, and of the JeI, through the war crimes trials and a ban on its participation in elections, have eliminated most democratic competition and encouraged the growth of a jihadist fringe. A purge of BNP and JeI sympathisers from the armed forces has elicited animosity within some military circles toward the Awami League, which the jihadists also appear to be seeking to exploit. The BNP, for its part, has on occasion used terrible violence, or supported groups that do so, fuelling political animus and deepening schisms.
The influx of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s Rakhine state in August-December 2017 also raises security concerns for Bangladesh. Jihadist groups – including ISIS and Pakistani militants – have referenced the Rohingya’s plight in efforts to mobilise support. For now, though, little suggests that the refugees are particularly susceptible to jihadist recruitment. Bangladesh’s response to the humanitarian tragedy should focus primarily not on counter-terrorism but on providing support for refugees and redoubling efforts to assuage potential friction between them and host communities.
The state
response to the surge of jihadist violence over the past few years has relied
primarily on blunt and indiscriminate force, including alleged enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Such tactics have eliminated large
numbers of jihadists and weakened militant groups. But they undermine
intelligence gathering. Security officials fear the ability of jihadist
movements to recruit, raise funds and conduct operations remains intact. To
make matters worse, Awami League leaders have exploited the threat to further
discredit the BNP and JeI, accusing them of complicity in high-profile attacks.
The government continues to use security forces to target its opponents,
motivated, it appears, by the imperative of victory in the December 2018
general elections.
While the past year has seen a lull in attacks, marginalising the mainstream political opposition is likely to play into the hands of jihadist groups. Politicised, the police force and judiciary will continue to struggle with the detailed investigative work necessary to disrupt networks that now tap not only madrasa students and their families in deprived rural areas but also privileged students in wealthier quarters of the capital. While the Awami League appears little inclined to do so ahead of this year’s vote, reversing the polarisation that creates an enabling environment for jihadists and building political consensus on how to tackle the problem, while investing in a professional police and judiciary, are likely prerequisites of forestalling further jihadist violence. Without a change of course – and particularly if the December elections trigger a crisis similar to that around previous polls – the country could face another jihadist resurgence.
While the past year has seen a lull in attacks, marginalising the mainstream political opposition is likely to play into the hands of jihadist groups. Politicised, the police force and judiciary will continue to struggle with the detailed investigative work necessary to disrupt networks that now tap not only madrasa students and their families in deprived rural areas but also privileged students in wealthier quarters of the capital. While the Awami League appears little inclined to do so ahead of this year’s vote, reversing the polarisation that creates an enabling environment for jihadists and building political consensus on how to tackle the problem, while investing in a professional police and judiciary, are likely prerequisites of forestalling further jihadist violence. Without a change of course – and particularly if the December elections trigger a crisis similar to that around previous polls – the country could face another jihadist resurgence.
Brussels, 28 February 2018
I.Introduction
Bangladesh faces
a sustained threat from jihadist attacks. Since 2015, two jihadist
groups, Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarul Islam (hereafter
Ansar), have targeted foreigners, secular activists and intellectuals,
religious and sectarian minorities, and other perceived opponents with rising
frequency. These groups appear to be
more integrated into transnational networks than earlier generations of
jihadists. Yet their expansion is largely rooted in domestic political
dynamics, which influence and inform state efforts against them.
The bloody 1-2 July 2016 siege at a café in Dhaka’s upscale Gulshan neighbourhood, the heart of the diplomatic zone, forced domestic and international policymakers to reconsider the extent to which jihadist militancy had taken root in Bangladesh. That three out of five alleged attackers belonged to Dhaka’s elite, not the madrasa sector more commonly associated with such jihadist militancy, suggests that the appeal of jihadism has spread and that jihadists may be able to tap a new constituency from which to recruit, even if thus far only in small numbers.
The report analyses the roots of Bangladesh’s jihadist groups, their goals, organisational dynamics, recruitment patterns and links to regional and transnational networks. It is based on interviews conducted in April-August 2017 with security officials, the legal community, and political and civil society actors, including representatives from Islamist parties and umbrella groups. Security risks inhibited access to jihadist groups and detainees; the report thus draws on their leaflets, online literature and public statements, and interviews with lawyers and law enforcement officials who have closely dealt with them. It proposes measures to counter the threat, based on analysis of the impact and effectiveness of the government’s response. Given the topic’s sensitivity, and an increasingly repressive environment in Bangladesh, most names have been withheld.
The bloody 1-2 July 2016 siege at a café in Dhaka’s upscale Gulshan neighbourhood, the heart of the diplomatic zone, forced domestic and international policymakers to reconsider the extent to which jihadist militancy had taken root in Bangladesh. That three out of five alleged attackers belonged to Dhaka’s elite, not the madrasa sector more commonly associated with such jihadist militancy, suggests that the appeal of jihadism has spread and that jihadists may be able to tap a new constituency from which to recruit, even if thus far only in small numbers.
The report analyses the roots of Bangladesh’s jihadist groups, their goals, organisational dynamics, recruitment patterns and links to regional and transnational networks. It is based on interviews conducted in April-August 2017 with security officials, the legal community, and political and civil society actors, including representatives from Islamist parties and umbrella groups. Security risks inhibited access to jihadist groups and detainees; the report thus draws on their leaflets, online literature and public statements, and interviews with lawyers and law enforcement officials who have closely dealt with them. It proposes measures to counter the threat, based on analysis of the impact and effectiveness of the government’s response. Given the topic’s sensitivity, and an increasingly repressive environment in Bangladesh, most names have been withheld.
II.Genesis of Jihadist Militancy
in Bangladesh
Jihadist
militancy in Bangladesh began in the 1980s, when around 3,000 Bangladeshis
reportedly joined the U.S. and Saudi-sponsored anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. A first generation of
Bangladeshi militants were veterans of that war. In 1992, a new group,
Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh (also referred to as Harkat-ul Jihad), led
by three Afghanistan veterans, Mufti Abdur Rouf, Mowlana Abdus Salam and Mufti
Abdul Hannan Sheikh, declared that Bangladesh should become an Islamic state. The group, which operated
from the Chittagong Hill Tracts bordering Myanmar, also aimed to aid the
Rohingya Muslims in that country. A Harkat-ul Jihad leader,
Fazlul Rahman, along with jihadist leaders from Pakistan and the Middle East,
signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for jihad against the U.S. and its
allies. In 1999, the group claimed a
failed assassination attempt on Bangladesh’s leading poet, journalist and human
rights activist Shamsur Rahman, and carried out a bomb attack at a cultural
event in Jessore that killed ten people.
After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S., the group became more active under the leadership of Mufti Hannan, who had established strong links with Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in Pakistan. In February 2002, it attacked the American Center in Calcutta, killing four police constables and a security guard, and injuring over twenty in the first strike on a target in India. In May 2004, it attempted to assassinate the British high commissioner to Dhaka. Its deadliest action was the August 2004 grenade attack on an election rally of then opposition leader and chief of the secular Awami League party, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, killing over twenty people; scores, including Hasina herself, were injured. In addition to attacks in Sylhet Division, in the north east, and areas around Dhaka, the Harkat-ul Jihad also struck numerous times in southern locations such as Akhaura, Bagerhat and Khulna, mostly between 1999-2005.
Founded in 1998, the JMB and its militant wing Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh became active in the early 2000s, recruiting and training, raising funds, running outreach programs, and mobilising members across the north and in selected southern districts such as Chittagong, Jessore and Khulna. Its Dhaka-based leader Abdur Rahman also began establishing links with political powerbrokers willing to support his agenda.
After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S., the group became more active under the leadership of Mufti Hannan, who had established strong links with Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in Pakistan. In February 2002, it attacked the American Center in Calcutta, killing four police constables and a security guard, and injuring over twenty in the first strike on a target in India. In May 2004, it attempted to assassinate the British high commissioner to Dhaka. Its deadliest action was the August 2004 grenade attack on an election rally of then opposition leader and chief of the secular Awami League party, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, killing over twenty people; scores, including Hasina herself, were injured. In addition to attacks in Sylhet Division, in the north east, and areas around Dhaka, the Harkat-ul Jihad also struck numerous times in southern locations such as Akhaura, Bagerhat and Khulna, mostly between 1999-2005.
Founded in 1998, the JMB and its militant wing Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh became active in the early 2000s, recruiting and training, raising funds, running outreach programs, and mobilising members across the north and in selected southern districts such as Chittagong, Jessore and Khulna. Its Dhaka-based leader Abdur Rahman also began establishing links with political powerbrokers willing to support his agenda.
Increasingly bitter competition between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party [...] led to paralysing street violence and a political crisis.
Jagrata itself
began as a vigilante group in north-eastern regions that had been the base of
left-wing militants for decades. Khaleda Zia’s BNP-led government (2001-2006)
initially failed to take action against it, due to limited law enforcement
capacity but also sympathy for these groups within Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI),
Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party and a member of the BNP’s governing
alliance. The animosity of the
military and some BNP leaders toward India also drove them to patronise various
Islamist groups supporting insurgencies in India’s north-eastern provinces and
Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Some government and police
officials saw the JMB and Jagrata as useful tools against left-wing militants.Despite
these reservations, domestic and international pressure nudged the government
to form, in 2004, an elite paramilitary anti-crime and anti-terrorism unit, the
Rapid Action Battalion, which includes military and police personnel.
JMB’s 17 August 2005 countrywide coordinated and simultaneous attacks, involving over 459 low-intensity bombs, in all but one of Bangladesh’s 64 districts, killing two people and injuring around 100, proved a turning point. The subsequent security crackdown, including trials and executions of top JMB members, forced the group into hiding. In the following years, its leaders described the synchronised 2005 attack as a “sound blast” to draw attention to their message, contained in leaflets left at the bombing sites, which called for war against “Western imperial powers” and their local allies, including Bangladesh’s secular state. The judicial system was a particular target; there were several attacks on judges and court premises.
JMB’s 17 August 2005 countrywide coordinated and simultaneous attacks, involving over 459 low-intensity bombs, in all but one of Bangladesh’s 64 districts, killing two people and injuring around 100, proved a turning point. The subsequent security crackdown, including trials and executions of top JMB members, forced the group into hiding. In the following years, its leaders described the synchronised 2005 attack as a “sound blast” to draw attention to their message, contained in leaflets left at the bombing sites, which called for war against “Western imperial powers” and their local allies, including Bangladesh’s secular state. The judicial system was a particular target; there were several attacks on judges and court premises.
While JMB and
Harkat-ul Jihad represented similar threats, and often operated in tandem,
violently opposing Bangladesh’s secular traditions, there were fundamental
differences. Harkat-ul Jihad drew on South Asian Islamic traditions, its
ideological bent close to that of today’s Deobandi-inspired Hefazat-e-Islam, a
hardline Islamist movement which over recent years has won concessions from the
ruling party (see Section VII.B). Harkat-ul Jihad was largely based in the
south, and it found its recruits in qaumi (privately run)
madrasas. JMB, on the other hand, drew on the Wahhabi-inspired Ahl-e Hadith
movement and was located mainly in the north east, though it also conducted
outreach and recruitment drives in the south west, in Satkhira and Bagerhat
districts.
Increasingly bitter competition between the Awami League and BNP ahead of elections scheduled for January 2007 led to paralysing street violence and a political crisis, prompting a coup and military rule, between 2006 and 2008, behind the veneer of a caretaker government. The military jailed much of the political class. The military-backed government redoubled counter-terrorism efforts, including through specialised trainings for law enforcement officials and anti-militancy messaging in the media and the state-run Islamic Foundation, as well as through Friday sermons in mosques across the country. It also tried some JMB leaders. Arrests and convictions of JMB and Harkat-ul Jihad members continued after the restoration of democracy and elections in December 2008, which returned the Awami League to office. By that time, the jihadist leadership appeared to have been dismantled and the security environment seemed much improved, leading law enforcement agencies to shift attention away from militant groups.
Increasingly bitter competition between the Awami League and BNP ahead of elections scheduled for January 2007 led to paralysing street violence and a political crisis, prompting a coup and military rule, between 2006 and 2008, behind the veneer of a caretaker government. The military jailed much of the political class. The military-backed government redoubled counter-terrorism efforts, including through specialised trainings for law enforcement officials and anti-militancy messaging in the media and the state-run Islamic Foundation, as well as through Friday sermons in mosques across the country. It also tried some JMB leaders. Arrests and convictions of JMB and Harkat-ul Jihad members continued after the restoration of democracy and elections in December 2008, which returned the Awami League to office. By that time, the jihadist leadership appeared to have been dismantled and the security environment seemed much improved, leading law enforcement agencies to shift attention away from militant groups.
III.Setting the Stage
for a Jihadist Resurgence
A.Politicised Justice
and an Islamist Backlash
The Awami League
came to power in January 2009 having promised an international war crimes
tribunal to prosecute those responsible for atrocities during the 1971 war of
independence, a longstanding demand popular with the party’s voter base. Most
of those expected to be tried were JeI members; others were from the BNP. The
tribunal was established in 2010.
While the quest for justice was legitimate, the trials were deeply flawed, lacking due process. They were also convenient tools for sidelining or eliminating rivals and rallying the Awami League’s political base. The convictions and executions that followed provoked a domestic backlash; many of the accused had major followings, notably among religiously conservative constituencies across the country. In particular, the 2013 death sentence for JeI leader Delwar Hossain Sayedee, a popular preacher, prompted violent countrywide demonstrations and clashes with police that left hundreds of protesters dead. Islamists portrayed the trials as an attack on Bangladesh’s Muslim identity.
Secular activists mobilised, too, though to insist on harsher sentences. In February 2013, after another JeI leader, Abdul Quader Mollah, was given life imprisonment, activists demonstrated in Dhaka’s Shahbagh square demanding a death sentence. These protests, dubbed the Shahbagh movement, were led by urban, secular youth, including bloggers critical of the role of organised religion in Bangladesh’s secular polity. Islamists highlighted these opinions to discredit the movement as anti-Islam, demanding that Shahbagh organisers be punished.
While the quest for justice was legitimate, the trials were deeply flawed, lacking due process. They were also convenient tools for sidelining or eliminating rivals and rallying the Awami League’s political base. The convictions and executions that followed provoked a domestic backlash; many of the accused had major followings, notably among religiously conservative constituencies across the country. In particular, the 2013 death sentence for JeI leader Delwar Hossain Sayedee, a popular preacher, prompted violent countrywide demonstrations and clashes with police that left hundreds of protesters dead. Islamists portrayed the trials as an attack on Bangladesh’s Muslim identity.
Secular activists mobilised, too, though to insist on harsher sentences. In February 2013, after another JeI leader, Abdul Quader Mollah, was given life imprisonment, activists demonstrated in Dhaka’s Shahbagh square demanding a death sentence. These protests, dubbed the Shahbagh movement, were led by urban, secular youth, including bloggers critical of the role of organised religion in Bangladesh’s secular polity. Islamists highlighted these opinions to discredit the movement as anti-Islam, demanding that Shahbagh organisers be punished.
The war crimes trials and the Shahbagh movement provided the backdrop for a new era of Islamist and jihadist activism.
The war crimes
trials and the Shahbagh movement provided the backdrop for a new era of
Islamist and jihadist activism. By 2013, JeI was on the defensive, with most of
its top leaders on trial. Hefazat-e-Islam, a hitherto marginal umbrella
organisation sustained by qaumi (privately run)
madrasas, stepped into the gap, quickly becoming a prominent socio-political
force by channelling Islamist sentiment against the trials in large street
demonstrations in late 2013. To defuse the protests, the government made
concessions, including withdrawing plans to regulate the qaumimadrasa
sector. Hefazat also allegedly
delivered the government a list of 84 bloggers and activists it wanted
prosecuted and executed for making derogatory statements about Islam.
A new kind of jihadist mobilisation surfaced shortly thereafter. On 15 February 2013, ten days after the Shahbagh demonstrations began, prominent blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, whose writings had in part inspired those demonstrations, was brutally murdered outside his home in Dhaka. A new group, the Ansarullah Bangla Team (later renamed Ansarul Islam), an affiliate of al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility. The following month, the group gave a thirteen-point list of demands to the government, including for a blasphemy law to try secular bloggers, marking a convergence in aspects of its agenda – though not its methods – with Hefazat.
A new kind of jihadist mobilisation surfaced shortly thereafter. On 15 February 2013, ten days after the Shahbagh demonstrations began, prominent blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, whose writings had in part inspired those demonstrations, was brutally murdered outside his home in Dhaka. A new group, the Ansarullah Bangla Team (later renamed Ansarul Islam), an affiliate of al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility. The following month, the group gave a thirteen-point list of demands to the government, including for a blasphemy law to try secular bloggers, marking a convergence in aspects of its agenda – though not its methods – with Hefazat.
B.Political
Polarisation
In addition to
the flawed trials, Bangladesh’s deeply polarised politics and the increasingly
exclusionary bent of the Awami League-led government have contributed to the
resurgence of militancy. In mid-2013, the Bangladeshi high court banned JeI
from contesting forthcoming parliamentary elections on the grounds that an
Islamist party running violated the secular constitution. Even if not a
political ruling, this ban served to undercut a critical ally of the Awami
League’s main rival, the BNP. It also led the JeI to resort to violence ahead
of the January 2014 vote. As elections approached, the government pushed ahead
with preparations despite the BNP’s objections; in the end, the BNP announced
the day before the polls that it would boycott. Law enforcement agencies focused
attention on opposition leaders and activists spearheading violent protests to
subvert the election.
By the end of 2013, at least 500 people had been killed, making it the deadliest year of civil strife since Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan in 1971. The polls themselves, in January 2014, were likewise marred by violence. Given the BNP’s boycott, Bangladesh’s parliament is almost bereft of opposition to the ruling party. A year later, a very violent campaign led by the BNP and JeI – replete with arson attacks on polling stations and assaults on policemen, as well as hartals (strikes) and transport blockades – marked the anniversary of those elections. This campaign, aimed at forcing fresh elections, provoked months of clashes, leaving around 150 people dead or missing. JeI activists were responsible for some of the worst attacks.
By the end of 2013, at least 500 people had been killed, making it the deadliest year of civil strife since Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan in 1971. The polls themselves, in January 2014, were likewise marred by violence. Given the BNP’s boycott, Bangladesh’s parliament is almost bereft of opposition to the ruling party. A year later, a very violent campaign led by the BNP and JeI – replete with arson attacks on polling stations and assaults on policemen, as well as hartals (strikes) and transport blockades – marked the anniversary of those elections. This campaign, aimed at forcing fresh elections, provoked months of clashes, leaving around 150 people dead or missing. JeI activists were responsible for some of the worst attacks.
The BNP’s
marginalisation from mainstream politics – part self-inflicted through its
boycott and violent tactics; part due to the government’s rejection of its
demands for electoral reforms – together with the government’s targeting of the
JeI through the war crimes trials and electoral ban, created a major political
vacuum. As law enforcement agencies focused on containing the Awami League’s
political opponents, they failed to effectively counter the emergence of the
Ansarul Islam and the re-emergence, starting around mid-2014, of the JMB, which
still had a nationwide network of members recruited from qaumi madrasas,
informants and sympathisers.
IV.Today’s Jihadist
Landscape
A.Ansarul Islam
What had started
as an online community reportedly inspired by the sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki, a
U.S. citizen who joined al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
peninsula, gradually morphed into a group of young Bangladeshis following a
fiery local preacher, Jashimuddin Rahmani, based in Dhaka’s Basila
neighbourhood. Ansar
soon began identifying itself, through online posts, as the Bangladesh chapter
of al-Qaeda.
Beginning in 2013, Ansar prioritised killing liberal and secular bloggers, many of whom were reportedly on the Hefazat’s alleged list of 84 activists. In an online statement, Ansar said it was targeting writers, journalists, intellectuals and artists who publicly insulted Islam, rather than unbelievers who kept their views private. In February 2015, Avijit Roy, a prominent U.S.-based blogger visiting Dhaka, was killed by machete-wielding assailants at a major book fair. In the course of the year, six more bloggers and two gay rights activists were similarly hacked to death, and four others injured, either in their homes or in public places, with all attacks claimed by Ansar.
Ansar is primarily urban-based. A well-informed source said many members do not know each other except through pseudonyms.Although it remains a small organisation, according to intelligence and counter-terrorism officials, Ansar has a formal structure that divides members into three groups, managed by a coordination team: dawa, which oversees logistics and recruitment; asqari, which oversees military training; and a media wing run by IT experts that collates domestic and international coverage of the group. The group also includes a sub-group, mashul, which plans and oversees all attacks, while the foot soldiers executing operations are part of a subcategory called mamur.
Beginning in 2013, Ansar prioritised killing liberal and secular bloggers, many of whom were reportedly on the Hefazat’s alleged list of 84 activists. In an online statement, Ansar said it was targeting writers, journalists, intellectuals and artists who publicly insulted Islam, rather than unbelievers who kept their views private. In February 2015, Avijit Roy, a prominent U.S.-based blogger visiting Dhaka, was killed by machete-wielding assailants at a major book fair. In the course of the year, six more bloggers and two gay rights activists were similarly hacked to death, and four others injured, either in their homes or in public places, with all attacks claimed by Ansar.
Ansar is primarily urban-based. A well-informed source said many members do not know each other except through pseudonyms.Although it remains a small organisation, according to intelligence and counter-terrorism officials, Ansar has a formal structure that divides members into three groups, managed by a coordination team: dawa, which oversees logistics and recruitment; asqari, which oversees military training; and a media wing run by IT experts that collates domestic and international coverage of the group. The group also includes a sub-group, mashul, which plans and oversees all attacks, while the foot soldiers executing operations are part of a subcategory called mamur.
Many prominent online activists either have fled Bangladesh or keep a lower profile.
Many of Ansar’s
leaders and members appear to be well educated and Dhaka-based. Rezwanul Azad
Rana, a former activist from Shibir, the youth wing of the JeI, and a teaching
assistant at North South, Dhaka’s largest private university, was reportedly
one of the group’s first organisers and allegedly planned and oversaw the
bloggers’ murders, before fleeing to Malaysia after law enforcement agencies
learned of his role. Other members kept Ansar’s
organisation intact and active after Rana’s departure. One was reportedly
Junoon Shikder, another North South student, arrested in 2013 for alleged links
with Ansar but released on bail a year later. He, too, fled to Malaysia, in
2014, whence he reportedly moved to Syria, suggesting he may have shifted his
allegiance from al-Qaeda to ISIS.
Since late 2015, the killings of bloggers have stopped. Many prominent online activists either have fled Bangladesh or keep a lower profile.Ansar itself appears to have faded from public attention, its appeal perhaps diminished in part because it arose in the context of the war crimes trials. With most high-profile Islamists accused of atrocities in 1971 convicted and some executed, the trials generate less immediate attention from the constituencies they initially outraged. Still, some security officials believe that Ansar and what the government calls the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” (discussed below) work closely together, contributing some of the 40 Bangladeshis who reportedly travelled to join ISIS in Syria.
Junoon and an unspecified number of other jihadists allegedly continue to operate Malaysia- and Singapore-based cells, which have been key to the transition of some Ansar members to ISIS, as well as to the facilitation of movement to Syria. Three of the five alleged attackers in the 2016 Dhaka attack reportedly had operated in Ansar’s Malaysia cells for various durations, while four others, who were indirectly involved, had also spent time in that country. Intelligence officials claim to regularly discover communications between jihadists in Bangladesh and Malaysia- or Singapore-based Ansar cells during investigations. Ansar’s current threat level is difficult to gauge, given that the organisation seems to be moving on from its original raison d’être, the war crimes trials, to a broader agenda.
Since late 2015, the killings of bloggers have stopped. Many prominent online activists either have fled Bangladesh or keep a lower profile.Ansar itself appears to have faded from public attention, its appeal perhaps diminished in part because it arose in the context of the war crimes trials. With most high-profile Islamists accused of atrocities in 1971 convicted and some executed, the trials generate less immediate attention from the constituencies they initially outraged. Still, some security officials believe that Ansar and what the government calls the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” (discussed below) work closely together, contributing some of the 40 Bangladeshis who reportedly travelled to join ISIS in Syria.
Junoon and an unspecified number of other jihadists allegedly continue to operate Malaysia- and Singapore-based cells, which have been key to the transition of some Ansar members to ISIS, as well as to the facilitation of movement to Syria. Three of the five alleged attackers in the 2016 Dhaka attack reportedly had operated in Ansar’s Malaysia cells for various durations, while four others, who were indirectly involved, had also spent time in that country. Intelligence officials claim to regularly discover communications between jihadists in Bangladesh and Malaysia- or Singapore-based Ansar cells during investigations. Ansar’s current threat level is difficult to gauge, given that the organisation seems to be moving on from its original raison d’être, the war crimes trials, to a broader agenda.
B.Jamaat-ul Mujahideen
Bangladesh
There were
initially clear distinctions between Ansar and JMB. Ansar members saw
themselves primarily as defenders of Islam battling Western secular ideas,
rather than fighting for an Islamic state. The group’s targets were limited to
those it considered to have insulted the faith. Most Ansar leaflets that
investigators recovered at attack sites emphasised that the organisation was
not at war with peoples of other faiths unless they slighted or undermined
Islam.
In contrast, JMB since its founding almost two decades ago, and again in its recent resurgence, has pursued the establishment of Islamic law and perceived anyone not subscribing to its interpretation of Islam, including religious and sectarian minorities, as well as non-Muslim foreigners, as legitimate prey. Thus, while Ansar targeted only individuals such as Bangladeshi secular and liberal bloggers, JMB, both as a whole and, later, a faction more closely identified with ISIS (discussed below), focused on Bangladesh’s minority communities, attacking Ahmadi mosques, Sufi shrines, Buddhist and Hindu temples, and Shia festivals, as well as prominent members of these communities. While ISIS claimed some of these attacks, police suspect a JMB role in executing them. Since 2015, JMB has expanded its activities beyond its traditional strongholds in the north and south west, and conducted attacks countrywide, including in Dhaka, where it was responsible – at least partly though perhaps entirely – for the 2016 attack.
In contrast, JMB since its founding almost two decades ago, and again in its recent resurgence, has pursued the establishment of Islamic law and perceived anyone not subscribing to its interpretation of Islam, including religious and sectarian minorities, as well as non-Muslim foreigners, as legitimate prey. Thus, while Ansar targeted only individuals such as Bangladeshi secular and liberal bloggers, JMB, both as a whole and, later, a faction more closely identified with ISIS (discussed below), focused on Bangladesh’s minority communities, attacking Ahmadi mosques, Sufi shrines, Buddhist and Hindu temples, and Shia festivals, as well as prominent members of these communities. While ISIS claimed some of these attacks, police suspect a JMB role in executing them. Since 2015, JMB has expanded its activities beyond its traditional strongholds in the north and south west, and conducted attacks countrywide, including in Dhaka, where it was responsible – at least partly though perhaps entirely – for the 2016 attack.
According to counter-terrorism officials, the [Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh] group recruits not just young men, but entire families, including women.
At the outset,
the outfit had four tiers, each defined by level of responsibility and
commitment to the organisation: majlis-e-shura, a
consultative decision-making council directly under the amir,
or chief; ehsar, or full-time members; gayeri
ehsar, or part-time activists; and sudhis(well-wishers) and saathis (comrades).
In principle, JMB’s organisational structure included a military wing,
comprised entirely of ehsar (the other
sections made up the non-military wing). This wing was meant to include six
divisions, each with a chief and deputy, and four sectors – ordnance,
operations, intelligence and medical – but it was never fully operationalised.
Each sector was also meant to have subdivisions. For example, explosives,
electronics technology, weapons collection and stockpiling fell under ordnance;
guerrillas and fedayeen (suicide attackers) under
operations.
Today, the majlis-e-shura reportedly has seven members. It approves all attacks and killings. The current amir, Salauddin, oversees regional commanders and brigades, which have both dawa, or logistics and recruitment, and military wings. In a recent interview, Salauddin said the group was expanding its network beyond Bangladesh, although it is difficult to assess the veracity of this claim; despite ties to militants elsewhere, the JMB itself has never perpetrated an attack outside Bangladesh.
According to counter-terrorism officials, the group recruits not just young men, but entire families, including women. They claim that recruiters also are attempting to attract youth in regions outside Dhaka that are politically volatile and have a large conservative base, including the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Noakhali, Lakshmipur and Chapainababganj.
Today, the majlis-e-shura reportedly has seven members. It approves all attacks and killings. The current amir, Salauddin, oversees regional commanders and brigades, which have both dawa, or logistics and recruitment, and military wings. In a recent interview, Salauddin said the group was expanding its network beyond Bangladesh, although it is difficult to assess the veracity of this claim; despite ties to militants elsewhere, the JMB itself has never perpetrated an attack outside Bangladesh.
According to counter-terrorism officials, the group recruits not just young men, but entire families, including women. They claim that recruiters also are attempting to attract youth in regions outside Dhaka that are politically volatile and have a large conservative base, including the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Noakhali, Lakshmipur and Chapainababganj.
C.“Neo-Jamaat-ul
Mujahideen” and ISIS
Since the 2016
Dhaka attack, law enforcement officials began using the term “neo-Jamaat-ul
Mujahideen”. Some analysts argue they use this term to obscure ISIS’s role in
Bangladesh, and that many ISIS members are described by security officials as
“neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen”. In an interview, JMB’s
current amir,
Salahuddin, dismissed the term as an invention of “infidels”. He did, however,
acknowledge that some members had joined ISIS.
The “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” faction – which refers to itself as Islamic State Bangladesh – was thought to be led by a Canadian-Bangladeshi, Tamim Chowdhury, until his August 2016 death in an alleged extrajudicial killing. The faction was divided by geographic region, with each regional unit led by a commander who focused on operational activities endorsed by the central leadership. Several regional commanders have been killed in Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi and points further north. The structure that Chowdhury headed appears to have been dismantled but counter-terrorism officials say it has splintered into smaller cells that, for now, conduct fewer coordinated operations.
In the run-up to the 2016 Dhaka attack, Chowdhury reportedly played a pivotal role in bringing together Ansar, a section of JMB’s network still active in northern districts and the south east, and individuals acting on behalf of ISIS in Bangladesh and Syria. Counter-terrorism officials believe he was the primary coordinator between ISIS and Bangladeshi jihadist groups. Chowdhury concentrated his recruitment efforts in Dhaka’s Banani neighbourhood and cantonment area, possibly tapping into discontent inside the army (discussed below). He also established contact with young extremists who provided access to youth studying at coaching centres. Many suspected militants detained or killed in security raids since July 2016 were young boys from affluent backgrounds who had months earlier left home; the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” appears to be mining a similar demographic to Ansar, in other words.
The “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” faction – which refers to itself as Islamic State Bangladesh – was thought to be led by a Canadian-Bangladeshi, Tamim Chowdhury, until his August 2016 death in an alleged extrajudicial killing. The faction was divided by geographic region, with each regional unit led by a commander who focused on operational activities endorsed by the central leadership. Several regional commanders have been killed in Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi and points further north. The structure that Chowdhury headed appears to have been dismantled but counter-terrorism officials say it has splintered into smaller cells that, for now, conduct fewer coordinated operations.
In the run-up to the 2016 Dhaka attack, Chowdhury reportedly played a pivotal role in bringing together Ansar, a section of JMB’s network still active in northern districts and the south east, and individuals acting on behalf of ISIS in Bangladesh and Syria. Counter-terrorism officials believe he was the primary coordinator between ISIS and Bangladeshi jihadist groups. Chowdhury concentrated his recruitment efforts in Dhaka’s Banani neighbourhood and cantonment area, possibly tapping into discontent inside the army (discussed below). He also established contact with young extremists who provided access to youth studying at coaching centres. Many suspected militants detained or killed in security raids since July 2016 were young boys from affluent backgrounds who had months earlier left home; the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” appears to be mining a similar demographic to Ansar, in other words.
ISIS began claiming responsibility for several attacks in Bangladesh on social media.
Even earlier, in
2015, Bangladeshi intelligence and security agencies uncovered communications
between local jihadists and Bangladeshi fighters in Syria, though they could
not decode much of the content. In a Chittagong raid, officials also discovered
an ISIS flag and evidence of communication among JMB members arguing in favour
of joining ISIS. ISIS also began claiming
responsibility for several attacks in Bangladesh – including the 2016 Dhaka
attack – on social media. The October 2015 issue of Dabiq, ISIS’s monthly
magazine, contained a special story on Bangladesh, praising earlier JMB
exploits. Saifullah Ozaki, a Bangladeshi who formerly was an associate
professor in Kyoto, reportedly played a key role through an online platform in
recruiting Bangladeshis to ISIS and arranging their travel to Syria. There have
been claims he may today even be the leader of the JMB faction – the “neo-Jamaat-ul
Mujahideen” – that is more closely identified with ISIS.
According to Bangladeshi counter-terrorism officials, local jihadists began using ISIS propaganda to appeal to middle- and upper middle-class youth, and inducting former activists from Hizb-ut Tahrir, a pan-Islamist missionary movement that rejects jihadist violence, and retired military personnel. By the time of the 2016 Dhaka attack, some Ansar and JMB elements appear to have also formally pledged allegiance to the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Many security and counter-terrorism experts believe that a new generation of jihadists, earlier linked to JMB or Ansar, now identifies more directly with ISIS than with purely homegrown entities. The government, however, refuses to acknowledge an ISIS presence in Bangladesh. Some police officials contend that acknowledgment of such a presence would be too politically costly at a time when the government claims counter-terrorism successes.
According to Bangladeshi counter-terrorism officials, local jihadists began using ISIS propaganda to appeal to middle- and upper middle-class youth, and inducting former activists from Hizb-ut Tahrir, a pan-Islamist missionary movement that rejects jihadist violence, and retired military personnel. By the time of the 2016 Dhaka attack, some Ansar and JMB elements appear to have also formally pledged allegiance to the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Many security and counter-terrorism experts believe that a new generation of jihadists, earlier linked to JMB or Ansar, now identifies more directly with ISIS than with purely homegrown entities. The government, however, refuses to acknowledge an ISIS presence in Bangladesh. Some police officials contend that acknowledgment of such a presence would be too politically costly at a time when the government claims counter-terrorism successes.
V.Flashpoints
A.Resentment in the
Military
Soon after it
assumed office in 2009, the Awami League faced a mutiny by personnel from the
Bangladesh Rifles, a border security force. Around 74 people were killed,
including senior counter-terror officials and 57 army officers. The
consequences of the insurrection, including a subsequent shakeup that saw
several officers removed or reassigned, continue to reverberate within an
institution that has held the levers of political power for seventeen of
Bangladesh’s 46 years as a state.
In November 2009, five serving and six former army officers were detained in the attempted murder of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s nephew, Awami League parliamentarian Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh. In January 2012, the army detained twelve officers for an alleged coup attempt. Although none was tried, most were dismissed on various grounds, most often indiscipline. Estimates of the number of officers sacked or forced into retirement since 2009 vary from 50 to 250. Many former officers, and even an adviser to Hasina at that time, believe the Bangladesh Rifles mutiny was used as a pretext by the Awami League government to restructure the army and purge it of more conservative pro-JeI and BNP elements that oppose the Awami League’s secularism.
To quell further dissent and unrest among officers and soldiers, the government offers financial incentives: salary hikes, budget increases and lucrative government contracts to military-controlled entities involved in housing, transport and major infrastructure projects. While these concessions may have yielded a less interventionist military in the short term, the aftereffects of the mutiny and the subsequent purges, which one former general officer described as “both a physical and psychological scar”, may have pushed a small number of his colleagues toward jihadism.
In November 2009, five serving and six former army officers were detained in the attempted murder of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s nephew, Awami League parliamentarian Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh. In January 2012, the army detained twelve officers for an alleged coup attempt. Although none was tried, most were dismissed on various grounds, most often indiscipline. Estimates of the number of officers sacked or forced into retirement since 2009 vary from 50 to 250. Many former officers, and even an adviser to Hasina at that time, believe the Bangladesh Rifles mutiny was used as a pretext by the Awami League government to restructure the army and purge it of more conservative pro-JeI and BNP elements that oppose the Awami League’s secularism.
To quell further dissent and unrest among officers and soldiers, the government offers financial incentives: salary hikes, budget increases and lucrative government contracts to military-controlled entities involved in housing, transport and major infrastructure projects. While these concessions may have yielded a less interventionist military in the short term, the aftereffects of the mutiny and the subsequent purges, which one former general officer described as “both a physical and psychological scar”, may have pushed a small number of his colleagues toward jihadism.
Much as discontent in the military provides opportunities that jihadists might exploit, so too could the Rohingya crisis.
One of the
officers implicated in the 2012 attempted coup, Major Syed Ziaul Hoque,
reportedly became Ansar’s military commander. Several young men living in
residential quarters for former army officers were arrested in 2015 for
attempting to establish ties to ISIS. The same year, a
counter-terrorism official claimed that law enforcement officials had found
military training manuals and military-issued uniforms and bullets during a
2015 raid of a jihadist hideout in Chittagong. Jihadist organisations are
clearly trying to tap into military disgruntlement.
B.The Rohingya Crisis
Much as
discontent in the military provides opportunities that jihadists might exploit,
so too could the Rohingya crisis. A brutal military campaign
against the Rohingya in late 2017, following an attack on security personnel by
the militant group, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA, also called Harakah
al-Yaqin) in the north of Myanmar’s Rakhine state, forced close to 700,000
Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh. The Awami League
government’s response has included confinement of Rohingyas to camps in border
regions and diplomacy aimed at ensuring the refugees’ return, including through
a late November repatriation agreement. Such efforts appear unlikely to bear
fruit, given the Myanmar authorities’ uncompromising stance and because
conditions in Rakhine state are not conducive to refugees returning in a safe
and sustainable manner.
The Rohingya influx has significant security ramifications for Bangladesh, though the challenge for Bangladeshi authorities is to assess the dangers accurately and adopt a measured and sensible response. A large, stateless population with slim prospects of returning to Myanmar any time soon places enormous strain on authorities and host communities, raising the potential for friction between refugees and the local population.
That said, clearly it would be counterproductive – even offensive – to portray the long-suffering Rohingya community, for many of whom the past few months have brought unimaginable horrors, as jihadists in waiting. Some reports suggest that a small number from the refugee camps have joined the ARSA, though that group remains focused on Myanmar; as yet no evidence suggests it has ties to transnational jihadism. In the past, militant Rohingya groups had small bases in Bangladeshi territories and one, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, collaborated with Jamaat-ul Mujahideen on weapons and explosives training; and some counter-terrorism analysts believe that Ansar might be training and arming Rohingya militants today.
The Rohingya influx has significant security ramifications for Bangladesh, though the challenge for Bangladeshi authorities is to assess the dangers accurately and adopt a measured and sensible response. A large, stateless population with slim prospects of returning to Myanmar any time soon places enormous strain on authorities and host communities, raising the potential for friction between refugees and the local population.
That said, clearly it would be counterproductive – even offensive – to portray the long-suffering Rohingya community, for many of whom the past few months have brought unimaginable horrors, as jihadists in waiting. Some reports suggest that a small number from the refugee camps have joined the ARSA, though that group remains focused on Myanmar; as yet no evidence suggests it has ties to transnational jihadism. In the past, militant Rohingya groups had small bases in Bangladeshi territories and one, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, collaborated with Jamaat-ul Mujahideen on weapons and explosives training; and some counter-terrorism analysts believe that Ansar might be training and arming Rohingya militants today.
Regional and transnational jihadist networks have shown interest in exploiting the Rohingyas’ plight.
Certainly, too,
regional and transnational jihadist networks have shown interest in exploiting
the Rohingyas’ plight. An April 2016 issue of Dabiq, ISIS’s online
magazine, included a Bangladeshi ISIS commander sounding a rallying cry to
fight for Rohingya rights. Al-Qaeda had included Myanmar on a 2014 list of key
targets, and in December 2016 its Bengali media output included a video call to
arms to avenge the persecution of Arakan Muslims. In a mid-September 2017
article in the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed’s main publication, Masood
Azhar, its leader, wrote: “All Muslims of the world must unite for this cause.
We have to do something and do it urgently. Myanmar’s soil is earnestly waiting
for the thumping sound of the footsteps of the conquerors”. Akayed
Ullah, the Bangladeshi immigrant who detonated a pipe bomb in a New York subway
corridor on 11 December 2017, had visited the Rohingya camps three months
earlier. That
said, jihadists have long drawn attention to the suffering of Muslims around
the world – including, for example, that of the Palestinians – to inspire
attacks yet frequently this tactic does not translate into jihadist inroads
into the conflicts in question.
Clearly, Bangladeshi authorities must remain alert to such dangers. Overall, though, their response to the Rohingya crisis should involve less counter-terrorism than humanitarian provision for a traumatised refugee population. They should concentrate as well on preventing and containing friction between Rohingyas and host communities.
Clearly, Bangladeshi authorities must remain alert to such dangers. Overall, though, their response to the Rohingya crisis should involve less counter-terrorism than humanitarian provision for a traumatised refugee population. They should concentrate as well on preventing and containing friction between Rohingyas and host communities.
VI.The State’s Response
A.Blunt Force
Since the 2016
Dhaka attack, law enforcement agencies have raided numerous jihadist hideouts
in different parts of the capital, neighbouring Narayanganj and Gazipur,
Chittagong, as well as in the north. Yet many counter-terrorism operations seem
focused on killing those suspected of involvement with jihadist networks,
rather than disrupting or dismantling those networks and countering their
influence. Some of these killings
reportedly have been staged as “fake encounters” or gun battles between
militants and police in which militants are killed.
Odhikar, a Bangladeshi human rights organisation, estimates that there have been as many as 2,000 such killings since 2001 by the Rapid Action Battalion and police, with 128 in 2016 and 154 in 2017. This group also says at least 330 people, including alleged militants as well as opposition BNP and JeI members, have disappeared since the Awami League government came to office in 2009. Many others have been detained for long periods without charge. Among the latter category were two survivors of the 2016 Dhaka attack, Hasnat Karim and Tahmid Hasib. Family members claimed that law enforcement personnel had apprehended them from their homes without warrants after images/videos of supposedly suspicious behaviour during the siege emerged on social media. Hasib was detained for almost a year before being released without charge; Karim remains in custody, charged with involvement in the attack, though officials have provided few details.
Since the 2016 attack, the Dhaka metropolitan police’s Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit, rather than the Rapid Action Battalion, has been given the counter-terrorism lead, a shift in authority that aims, according to officials, to build specialised counter-terrorism expertise in the force. But instead of using intelligence for operations aimed at dismantling jihadist groups, the state’s response continues to consist mostly of killing suspected militants, as is evident in recent raids in Comilla, Chittagong, Sylhet, Rajshahi and elsewhere. A district police official acknowledged that extrajudicial killings were common.
Odhikar, a Bangladeshi human rights organisation, estimates that there have been as many as 2,000 such killings since 2001 by the Rapid Action Battalion and police, with 128 in 2016 and 154 in 2017. This group also says at least 330 people, including alleged militants as well as opposition BNP and JeI members, have disappeared since the Awami League government came to office in 2009. Many others have been detained for long periods without charge. Among the latter category were two survivors of the 2016 Dhaka attack, Hasnat Karim and Tahmid Hasib. Family members claimed that law enforcement personnel had apprehended them from their homes without warrants after images/videos of supposedly suspicious behaviour during the siege emerged on social media. Hasib was detained for almost a year before being released without charge; Karim remains in custody, charged with involvement in the attack, though officials have provided few details.
Since the 2016 attack, the Dhaka metropolitan police’s Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit, rather than the Rapid Action Battalion, has been given the counter-terrorism lead, a shift in authority that aims, according to officials, to build specialised counter-terrorism expertise in the force. But instead of using intelligence for operations aimed at dismantling jihadist groups, the state’s response continues to consist mostly of killing suspected militants, as is evident in recent raids in Comilla, Chittagong, Sylhet, Rajshahi and elsewhere. A district police official acknowledged that extrajudicial killings were common.
Some law enforcement officials express concern that killing rather than apprehending militants wastes opportunities to obtain vital intelligence.
Many government
and law enforcement officials believe the criminal justice system incapable of
dealing effectively with terrorism cases, as delays and prolonged trials often
end without convictions while militants recruit and proselytise in prisons. A
former Rapid Action Battalion official claimed that jailed militants
established protection rackets for petty criminals, whom they eventually
recruit. A prison official suggested
that prisons employ Islamic scholars: “I find myself at sea trying to argue
religion with [detained] militants, who know a lot more about Islam than I do.
How am I meant to prevent radicalisation here?”
Circumvention of the criminal justice system is clearly the wrong response, however. It undermines the state’s legitimacy, sows fear and mistrust between authorities and communities, and risks provoking a violent backlash. The culture of impunity it breeds also erodes professionalism in the security forces and in some cases appears to have encouraged other forms of criminality. Some members are involved in contract killings and kidnappings for ransom; in 2014, a spate of murders in Narayanganj involved top Rapid Action Battalion officials including a former army lieutenant colonel.
Human rights activists argue that the culture of impunity around enforced disappearances and unlawful detention has a lasting impact on victims and their families and undercuts the government’s internal security objectives. Extrajudicial killings feed jihadist propaganda about injustice; Ansar has shared images of those killed during the 2013 Hefazat protests through its Telegram channel to entice new recruits.
Circumvention of the criminal justice system is clearly the wrong response, however. It undermines the state’s legitimacy, sows fear and mistrust between authorities and communities, and risks provoking a violent backlash. The culture of impunity it breeds also erodes professionalism in the security forces and in some cases appears to have encouraged other forms of criminality. Some members are involved in contract killings and kidnappings for ransom; in 2014, a spate of murders in Narayanganj involved top Rapid Action Battalion officials including a former army lieutenant colonel.
Human rights activists argue that the culture of impunity around enforced disappearances and unlawful detention has a lasting impact on victims and their families and undercuts the government’s internal security objectives. Extrajudicial killings feed jihadist propaganda about injustice; Ansar has shared images of those killed during the 2013 Hefazat protests through its Telegram channel to entice new recruits.
Some law
enforcement officials also express concern that killing rather than
apprehending militants wastes opportunities to obtain vital intelligence. A
security official contended that a killing in 2015 in which he was involved
might have cost law enforcement agencies an opportunity to uncover planning for
and disrupt the 2016 Dhaka attack. Other
security officials said the killing of captured militants prevented
investigation of suspected cells, including in regions close to Bangladesh’s
border with India. Inadequate
investigations and questioning of arrested militants may lead to similarly
squandered opportunities. A prominent human rights activist argued, for
example, that more thorough investigations of arrested militants’ involvement
in earlier attacks on foreigners could have yielded intelligence about
impending attacks, including that same Dhaka attack.
B.Following the Money
Jihadist groups
raise funds from multiple sources. Militants’ families apparently contribute
considerable sums for individual attacks, to hide and train operatives, and to
acquire weapons. Zakat, obligatory Islamic
alms for the poor, was a major funding source for the previous generation of
jihadists and is still tapped by such groups.
Bangladesh’s long, porous borders with India and Myanmar pose particular challenges to countering the flow of illicit funds, some of which may end up bankrolling jihadist operations. Indeed, Bangladesh is “a trans-shipment point for drugs produced in both the ‘golden triangle’ of Southeast Asia and ‘golden crescent’ of Central Asia”. According to a former senior security official, jihadist outfits also depend on forged Indian currency from Pakistan. Individuals as well as organisations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular fund madrasas and mosques across Bangladesh, with some of the money apparently finding its way to jihadist groups.
Particularly vexing is the jihadist use of hundi, an informal domestic and international money transfer mechanism. For the most part, this mechanism is benign: an estimated six million Bangladeshis working in the Middle East and South East Asia send home about $12-15 billion annually, about half of it through hundi. But JMB has long run its own hundi operations that provide both profits and a secure method of moving funds. Moving small sums over time is a simple way of evading detection. The central bank, Bangladesh Bank, has had marginal success in screening these transfers. More promising are its attempts to make more attractive the use of regular banking channels for remittances.
Bangladesh’s long, porous borders with India and Myanmar pose particular challenges to countering the flow of illicit funds, some of which may end up bankrolling jihadist operations. Indeed, Bangladesh is “a trans-shipment point for drugs produced in both the ‘golden triangle’ of Southeast Asia and ‘golden crescent’ of Central Asia”. According to a former senior security official, jihadist outfits also depend on forged Indian currency from Pakistan. Individuals as well as organisations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular fund madrasas and mosques across Bangladesh, with some of the money apparently finding its way to jihadist groups.
Particularly vexing is the jihadist use of hundi, an informal domestic and international money transfer mechanism. For the most part, this mechanism is benign: an estimated six million Bangladeshis working in the Middle East and South East Asia send home about $12-15 billion annually, about half of it through hundi. But JMB has long run its own hundi operations that provide both profits and a secure method of moving funds. Moving small sums over time is a simple way of evading detection. The central bank, Bangladesh Bank, has had marginal success in screening these transfers. More promising are its attempts to make more attractive the use of regular banking channels for remittances.
The government
has taken steps to counter money laundering and terrorist financing. The 2009
Anti-Terrorism Act empowered Bangladesh Bank to freeze accounts and take other
actions to curb criminal activity. The Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2012
and 2013 amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act lengthened the list of money
laundering offenses and expanded the categories of reporting entities, while
widening the scope of legal sanctions. The 2012 Mutual Legal Assistance Act
aimed to strengthen international cooperation efforts. And Bangladesh became a
member of the Asia Pacific Group on money laundering in July 2013.
These efforts have met with international approval. In February 2014, the international Financial Action Task Force removed Bangladesh from its “grey list” which includes “jurisdictions with strategic AML [Anti-Money Laundering]/CFT [Combatting the Financing of Terrorism] deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies”,and an October 2016 Asia Pacific Group assessment noted significant improvement in compliance with international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards. It also found that the Bangladesh Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit effectively disseminated information to law enforcement and other agencies. The 2017 Basel anti-money laundering index, published by the Switzerland-based Babel Institute on Governance, ranked Bangladesh second in South Asia behind India.
Bangladeshi authorities now need to get better at investigating and prosecuting complex financial crimes. The state has won very few money laundering and terrorist financing convictions, though hundreds of cases are pending. Law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to collate and understand financial intelligence, including that gathered by the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, and at making use of that intelligence in their investigations.
These efforts have met with international approval. In February 2014, the international Financial Action Task Force removed Bangladesh from its “grey list” which includes “jurisdictions with strategic AML [Anti-Money Laundering]/CFT [Combatting the Financing of Terrorism] deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies”,and an October 2016 Asia Pacific Group assessment noted significant improvement in compliance with international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards. It also found that the Bangladesh Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit effectively disseminated information to law enforcement and other agencies. The 2017 Basel anti-money laundering index, published by the Switzerland-based Babel Institute on Governance, ranked Bangladesh second in South Asia behind India.
Bangladeshi authorities now need to get better at investigating and prosecuting complex financial crimes. The state has won very few money laundering and terrorist financing convictions, though hundreds of cases are pending. Law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to collate and understand financial intelligence, including that gathered by the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, and at making use of that intelligence in their investigations.
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